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Abstract 
Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in politics, business, and almost 
any other form of social interaction. Informational asymmetries may create incentives for the 
better-informed party to exploit her advantage by misrepresenting information. Using a game-
theoretic setting, we investigate the neural basis of deception in human interaction. Unlike in 
most previous fMRI research on deception, the participants decide themselves whether to lie 
or not. We find activation within the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), the (pre)cuneus (CUN), and the anterior frontal gyrus (aFG) when 
contrasting lying with truth telling. Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the 
neural foundations of sophisticated deception through telling the truth—when the sender does 
not expect the receiver to believe her (true) message. Sophisticated deception triggers 
activation within the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the 
CUN, and aFG. We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender’s 
veridical intention to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the 





  3 
Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in politics, business, 
and almost any other form of social interaction. Such situations may provide an incentive for 
either party to exploit the informational asymmetries to their own advantage. This may then 
imply the use of deception. Although there is some debate about a coherent and generally 
accepted definition, typically experimental (neuroscientific) investigations are based on a 
conceptual definition of deception as a deliberate act that is “intended to foster in another 
person a belief or understanding which the deceiver considers false […]. Specifically, the 
deceiver transmits a false message (while hiding the true information) […].” (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981, p. 3). Consider, for example, customers in a restaurant who ask 
the waiter if the lobster is fresh. The waiter may care only about the customers’ well-being, 
and answer truthfully. Alternatively, she may be motivated by the restaurant’s need to get rid 
of the less fresh lobsters and answer untruthfully. Informational asymmetries often provide an 
incentive for the better-informed party to exploit her informational advantage by holding back 
information from another party, thus involving some sort of lying or misrepresentation of 
information.   
Yet, wrongly informing the interaction partner about the true nature of a situation is 
only one form of deception and excludes other important deceptive acts, such as sophisticated 
deception (Sutter, 2009). By taking into account the sender’s thoughts about the receiver’s 
belief, sending a true message can also be classified as a form of deception. Particularly, the 
sender may tell the receiver about the true state of the world, hoping she will think the sender 
is lying and will therefore not act according to the information provided. For instance, think 
of opposing parties in war. Here, a sophisticated lie would be to tell the enemy exactly what 
you are going to do, hoping the opponent will think you are lying and will therefore not act 
according to the information you provide. In contrast, a plain lie would mean sending the 
wrong information, such as pretending to invade the other’s territory at a different location 
from where the attack is actually carried out. Accordingly, sophisticated deception and simple 
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deception can be delineated along the dimensions “truth of the proposition” (true vs. false) 
and “the sender’s belief about the receiver’s expectation” (to be deceived vs. not to be 
deceived), whereas the intention of the sender is in both cases to deceive the receiver. In 
contrast, sophisticated deception can be delineated from plainly telling the truth along the 
dimensions “intention of the sender” (to deceive vs. not to deceive) and “the sender’s belief 
about the receiver’s expectation” (to be deceived vs. not to be deceived). Together, 
sophisticated deception can be thought of as some sort of a hybrid, it conveys literally the 
truth, but is intended (and expected) to be perceived as a lie.  
In this paper, we analyze the neural foundations of simple as well as sophisticated 
deception in strategic interactions. Particularly, we ask whether brain activation patterns can 
reveal the sender’s true intention and can disentangle the two forms of deception, namely 
simple and sophisticated deception. By using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI), we can derive qualitative and quantitative predictions for brain activation patterns 
that can help to contrast different candidate strategies that may not be evident from behavioral 
data alone.   
As outlined above and put forward repeatedly for deception in interactive contexts (cp. 
meta-analysis by Lisofsky et al., 2014), the intention to deceive requires the sender to 
anticipate the receiver’s mental state and thus think about her beliefs and expectations. 
Building on the notion that telling the truth is some sort of baseline (Cui et al., 2014), we 
propose that the intention to deceive the interaction partner, regardless of how it is expressed 
eventually, requires additional socio-cognitive processes than does telling the truth. This 
should also be reflected by longer reaction times for both sorts of deceptive behavior when 
compared to truth telling as well as be reflected on the phenomenological level (i.e., senders’ 
reports). Therefore, we expect increased neural activation when comparing simple and 
sophisticated deception to plainly telling the truth specifically within regions that have been 
associated with theory of mind (ToM) processes, such as the right temporo-parietal junction 
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(TJP), including the posterior superior temporal gyrus/angular gyrus (Amodio & Frith, 2006; 
Decety & Lamm, 2007; Frith & Frith, 1999; Vogeley et al. 2001; Wolf, Dziobek, & 
Heekeren, 2010) and with social cognition, such as the temporal pole (TP) (Frith, 2007; 
Moriguchi et al., 2006; for a review see Olson et al., 2007). The hypothesized activation 
pattern reflecting the intention to deceive (TPJ, TP,) shall also be observed for sophisticated 
deception when compared to plain truth trials. Therefore, we could distinguish the two forms 
of sending objectively true messages and unfold the sender’s true (deceptive) intention. 
Finding activation within areas reflecting socio-cognitive processes specifically for deceptive 
behavior (irrespective of how it unfolds) as compared to truth telling would be novel and 
taken to indicate the specific requirement of such processes for deception in strategic 
interactions. In other words, if the outcome of the interaction depends on both, the sender and 
the receiver, deceptive behavior – undertaken to get a (monetary) advantage – requires other 
processes than solely saying the truth and therewith accepting the outcome of the interaction 
without any attempts to influence it. 
For plain lies (as compared to plainly telling the truth) we expect (in addition to TPJ 
and TP) activation within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). A recent quantitative meta-
analysis on deceptive behavior in social interactive paradigms (Lisofsky et al., 2014) 
suggested this activation “to indicate greater conflict processing during deception in social 
situations in which people are especially supposed to behave honestly” (Liskofsky et al., 
2014, p. 119). This ACC activation for plain lies is expected to vary depending on the 
intensity of conflict, which we define as the product of the differences of the sender’s and the 
receiver’s monetary payoffs.  
Taking into account the sender’s true intention, allows us (for the first time) to 
specifically investigate the neural correlates of genuine truth trials. In none of the previous 
imaging studies on deception did the authors report any specific activation pattern for telling 
the truth. If this was due to truth trials being a heterogeneous category (for instance, including 
  6 
truth trials with the intention to deceive), we shall find a specific activation pattern for telling 
the truth in this study.  
 
Studying deception in strategic interaction requires participants be given a choice of whether 
to deceive another person, because only when they have a choice can we find out the 
circumstances under which subjects will resort to deception (Abe et al., 2007; Greene & 
Paxton, 2009; Sip et al., 2010; for a review see Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008). 
For this reason, paying subjects according to their choices – as is standard in experimental 
economics (Smith, 1976) – is important. Accordingly, in the present study participants played 
a simple sender-receiver game (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Gneezy, 2005). In this two-person 
game, the sender (e.g., the waiter in the introductory example) is informed about two possible 
states of the world (the lobster is fresh or not) that yield particular payoffs for the sender and 
the receiver (the customer). The sender can send a message to the receiver that is either true or 
false with respect to which state of the world is more profitable for the receiver. Based on this 
message, the receiver makes a decision (whether to order the lobster or not), thus determining 
the payoffs for the sender and the receiver. That is, the monetary payoff for the sender highly 
depends on whether she is successful in making the receiver believe her. We assume the 
receiver cannot figure out whether the message is true (e.g., the customer cannot retaliate if he 
finds out the lobster was bad). This is different from a recent paper on the neural circuitry of a 
broken promise in which the person sending a promise was also the person making the 
decision about whether to keep the promise (Baumgartner et al., 2009). In our context, 
sending a message is the only action the sender can take and thus the only way in which she 
might influence the receiver. Taken together, our paradigm addresses widespread concerns 
around ecological validity of experiments on deception in that it is truly interactive, 
participants have a real opportunity to deceive another person who is not a confederate, and 
participants’ payoffs (in the role of the sender) depend fully on the decision of the receiver. 
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Moreover, due to the specificity that the receiver cannot find out whether the sender had sent 
a wrong message or not allows us to investigate deceptive behavior in strategic interactions 
that is unaffected by learning and adaptation effects. It is for the latter reason that we give no 
feedback to receivers about the actual options from which the sender could choose from. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-four (17 women, mean age 24.3 years, SD 2.6, range 21-32 years) right-handed1, 
healthy volunteers (without any neurological or psychiatric history) participated in the fMRI 
experiment for a payment of 12 Euro per hour. Additionally to this show-up fee, participants 
could earn up to 30 Euros. That is, at the end of the experiment, one trial was randomly drawn 
and paid out according to the receiver’s choice in this specific trial. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, spoke German as their native language, and none had 
irremovable metal implants in their bodies. The experimental procedure and data collection 
followed the ethical guidelines of the "Declaration of Helsinki" (revised version, 2012) and 
were approved by the local ethical committee of the University of Cologne. Data were 
handled anonymously. We had to exclude four participants (1 male and 3 female) from the 
analysis because of too few lying or sophisticated deception trials, respectively, and one 
participant because of zero truth trials.  
 
Stimuli and Experimental Paradigm 
In the sender-receiver game, there are two players of which only the sender (the person being 
scanned) is informed about the monetary consequences for herself and the receiver for two 
different options, one being associated with Blue color and the other with Red color. Let Blue 
                                                        
1 In recent years, a vast number of imaging studies have shown that there are marked differences in the neural localization of cognitive (and 
especially language) functions in the brains of left-handed individuals when compared with right-handers. To exclude a putative effect of 
lateralization correlated with handedness we had chosen to only include right-handers in our imaging study. 
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(Sb, Rb) represent the payoff to the sender and the receiver, respectively, from choosing Blue, 
and Red (Sr, Rr) from choosing Red (cp. Figure 1). After being informed about these pairs of 
payoffs, the sender sends a message to the receiver, saying either “Blue is more profitable for 
you” or “Red is more profitable for you.” After sending a message, the sender has to indicate 
on a new screen which state she expects the receiver to pick. Then the next trial started. All in 
all, 90 games were played that differed with respect to the relative gains and losses for the two 
players (see below).  
 We call a choice a sophisticated deception when a sender sent the true message 
expecting the receiver not to follow it. We denote as a true message a case in which a sender 
sent the true message and expects the receiver to follow it by picking the state the message 
indicated as more profitable. We classify as simple deception cases in which the sender sent 
the false message. After receiving the message from the sender, the receiver chooses Blue or 
Red, and the respective payoffs are recorded (cp. Table 1).  
 While the sender underwent the anatomical scanning session (to obtain the individual 
anatomical structures onto which the metabolic activity map was projected), the receiver 
played the game in another room, which was located across campus, and it was ensured that 
sender and receiver never met each other. This was done to exclude any effects that might 
arise as a consequence of attractiveness, sympathy, gender, or the like. After the receiver 
finished her part (which was approximately at the time the scanning session of the sender was 
finished), one trial was randomly picked by the experimenter and the corresponding payoff 
(additional to the show-up fee of 12 Euros/h) was paid out to the sender and the receiver 
according to the receiver’s choice. The mean additional payout for senders was €8.53 
(SD=5.54), ranging from 5 to 20 Euros; the mean additional payout for receivers was €8.26 
(SD=6.15), ranging from 0 to 25, not being significantly different (t(58)=.176, p=.861). The 
full set of instructions is provided in the Appendix and both, sender and receiver, knew about 
the entire procedure before starting the experimental session (see A.1 and A.2).   
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In each of the 90 games, the sender was asked to send one of the above messages to 
the receiver. One of these messages was always true and the other was false. Knowing only 
the message she received and not the potential payoffs in each state, the receiver had to pick 
either Blue or Red, which then determined the payoffs for the sender and the receiver. Since 
the receiver was only informed about her actual payoff in the chosen state—and not about the 
sender’s actual payoff or the possible payoffs in the un-chosen state—the receiver could not 
judge whether the sender had told the truth or not. Yet, the receiver was informed that the 
maximum profits for her and the sender was 30 Euros. It was important that the receiver did 
not know about the potential payoffs in each state (but only the payoff of the actually chosen 
option in the current trial), otherwise she would have adjusted her behavior, thus confounding 
objectivity and comparability (within and across participants) as well as affecting the sender’s 
strategic behavior. Likewise, to exclude learning and order effects on the side of the sender’s 
behavior, the sender did not learn about the decisions of the receiver. 
We varied the incentives for deception along three different categories for the 90 
games, indicating the possible tension between the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs (i.e., 
stimulus-dependent categorization independent of participants’ choice). In the category 
“conflict” (n=45), the more profitable state for the sender was always less profitable for the 
receiver. We also varied the relative gains and losses of the sender and the receiver between 
the two states of a game. In category “sender indifferent” (n=27), the sender earned the same 
amount of money in both states, but the receiver payoff differed across states, and it could be 
higher or lower than the sender’s payoff. Category “aligned interests” (n=18) included only 
pairs of states in which one state yielded higher profits both for the sender and the receiver, 
although the increase in payoffs from the worse to the better state could differ for sender and 
receiver. The order of presentation of games was randomized. The full set of games is 
provided in the Appendix (see A.3). 
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 All trials lasted for 16 s (i.e., 8 scans at TR = 2 s): the game with its monetary payoffs 
was presented for a maximum of 8 s, during which time participants could respond, followed 
by a short fixation (2 s) and then the question about the sender’s expectation (4 s). 
Subsequently, the announcement that the next trial was about to start was presented for 2 s. 
To help to characterize the shape of the hemodynamic response function, the timing of the 
presentation of the stimulus was varied. Accordingly, using a jittering-method more points of 
the hemodynamic response function can be sampled than if a fixed inter-stimulus-interval was 
used. Particularly, we randomly varied the onset of each stimulus presentation relative to the 
beginning of the first of the eight scans (0, 400, 800, 1200, 1600 ms) to enhance the temporal 
resolution of the signal captured (Birn, Cox, & Bandettini, 2002; Miezin et al., 2000).  
 
MR Scanning Procedure 
Image Acquisition: Imaging was performed on a 3T scanner (Siemens TRIO, Erlangen, 
Germany) equipped with a standard birdcage head coil. Participants lay supine in the scanner 
with their hands placed on a right and left response button box. The index fingers were placed 
on two appropriate response buttons and participants were trained about the response 
contingencies. Form-fitting cushions were used to prevent participants from head movement 
and they were provided with earplugs to attenuate the scanner noise. The experiment was 
presented via a mirror that was mounted to the headcoil and individually adjusted.   
 One of the areas, in which we expected activation, is the temporal pole. This area is 
subject to severe distortion and signal loss in fMRI due to susceptibility artifacts that result 
from the area’s specific location, i.e., near air-filled sinuses (Ojemann et al., 1997). Therefore, 
we used a spin-echo (SE) sequence which has been shown to be less sensitive to 
susceptibility-related signal dropouts as in contrast to gradient-echo (GE) sequences 
(Schmidt, Boesiger, & Ishai, 2005; Norris et al., 2002). Yet, the drawback of using SE-based 
instead of GE-based fMRI is a lower statistical power of the SE sequences. 
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 During functional imaging, 17 axial slices (4 mm thickness, 25% spacing, field of 
view [FOV] 21 cm, data matrix of 64 x 64 voxels, and in-plane resolution of 3.3 mm x 3.3 
mm) covering the whole brain were collected using a single-shot spin-echo echo-planar 
imaging (SE-EPI) sequence (TR 2 s, echo time [TE] 80 ms, flip angle 90°) sensitive to blood 
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. One functional run with 728 timepoints was run 
with each time point sampling over the 17 slices. After the functional imaging, high-
resolution 3D T1-weighted whole brain MDEFT sequences (128 sagittal slices, 1 mm 
thickness) were recorded.  
Image processing and analysis: The functional imaging data were processed and analyzed 
using the software package LIPSIA (Leipzig Image Processing and Statistical Inference 
Algorithms) version 2.2 (Lohmann et al., 2001). To correct for temporal offsets between the 
slices acquired in one scan, a cubic-spline interpolation was used. Thereafter the data were 
motion-corrected with the 50th time-step as a reference and 6 degrees of freedom (3 
translational, 3 rotational). A temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 1/120 Hz 
was used to remove low-frequency signal changes and baseline drifts and a spatial Gaussian 
filter with 6 mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM) was applied. A rigid linear registration 
with six degrees of freedom (three rotational, three translational) was performed to align the 
functional data slices with a 3D stereotactic coordinate reference system. The rotational and 
translational parameters were acquired on the basis of the MDEFT slices to achieve an 
optimal match between these slices and the 3D reference data dataset.  The MDEFT volume 
data was standardized to the MNI atlas. The rotational and translational parameters were 
subsequently transformed by linear scaling to the same standard size. The resulting 
parameters were then used to transform the functional slices employing a trilinear 
interpolation, so that the resulting functional slices were aligned with the stereotactic 
coordinate system. Resulting data had a spatial resolution of 3 x 3 x 3 mm (27mm3). 
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The statistical evaluation was based on a least-squares estimation using the general 
linear model (GLM) for serially auto-correlated observations (Friston et al., 1995; Worsley & 
Friston, 1995). The design matrix was generated with a delta function, convolved with the 
hemodynamic response function (gamma function) (Glover, 1999). We used two different 
design matrices to answer the different research questions. One design matrix comprised the 
following events: truth trials, simple deception trials, and sophisticated deception trials (cp. 
Table 1). The trials were classified based on participants’ behavior, i.e., their choice which 
message to send to the receiver and their response to the question “Which state do you expect 
the receiver to choose?”. Events were modeled time-locked to the beginning of a game. The 
duration was modeled individually with the time it took participants to respond to the game 
(RT) (Grinband et al., 2008) and with amplitude of one. In another design matrix that was 
used to model and investigate the effects of conflict (defined as the tension between the 
sender’s and receiver’s payoffs), we had five regressors, particularly, truth trials, simple 
deception trials, and sophisticated deception trials with their duration being modeled 
individually by RT and amplitude of one plus two regressors for simple deception trials and 
sophisticated deception trials that were modeled with their individual RT and an amplitude 
that reflected the tension between the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs. The tension to deceive 
was calculated as the product of the differences of the sender’s and the receiver’s payoff for 
the pairs of states, i.e., (Sb-Sr)*(Rr-Rb). (cp. description of stimulus material and Figure 1). For 
instance, let Sb=15, Sr=5, Rr=15, and Rb=5, then the value representing the tension between 
the player’s payoffs is (15-5)*(15-5) = 100. In contrast, for a matrix with the payoffs Sb=1, 
Sr=0, Rr=5, and Rb=0, the conflict value is low ((1-0)*(5-0)=5). This value represents the 
product of the difference of the profit of the sender and the corresponding inverted difference 
of the receiver. This means that if the differences have opposite signs, then the sender and the 
receiver have conflicting interests. In case the differences have the same sign, both the sender 
and the receiver gain higher profits in the same state. If the sender is indifferent between the 
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two states, the parameter value is zero. Hence, this conflict parameter reflects a measure of 
the tension to deceive. 
 For each participant, contrast images were generated on the basis of beta-value 
estimates of the raw-score differences between specified conditions. Subsequently, these 
single subject contrasts were entered into a second-level analysis on the basis of Bayesian 
statistics (Lazar, 2008; Neumann & Lohmann, 2003). In the approach by Neumann and 
Lohmann (2003), posterior probability maps and maps of the effect size are calculated on the 
basis of the resulting least-square estimates of parameters for the GLM. That is, the parameter 
estimates on the second level of analysis are viewed within a Bayesian framework as evidence 
for the presence or absence of the effect of interest in a group of participants. The output of 
the Bayesian second-level analysis is a probability map showing the probability for the 
contrast to be larger than zero. This Bayesian technique allows us to directly estimate the 
probability of a specific difference in the group means given the parameter estimates of the 
GLM for the individual participants. This is more informative than a classical rejection of a 
null hypothesis. This approach has the further advantage, when compared with conventional 
analyses based on t statistics, of being less sensitive to outliers than traditional t statistics, as 
the influence of individual participants on a group statistic is weighted by the within-subject 
variability. In support of this, Thirion et al. (2007) suggested that, from the point of view of 
reliability, optimal statistical thresholds for activation maps are lower than classical thresholds 
corrected for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, since probabilities of the contrasts are 
calculated, but no significance tests are performed, corrections for multiple comparisons or 
calculations of effect sizes are not necessary. For visualization, a threshold of 99.4% was 
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As expected, the frequency of sending the false message strongly depends on a game’s 
category, i.e., on the distribution of payoffs (for a description of the stimulus-dependent 
categorization please see Stimuli and Experimental Paradigm): it is fairly low in the “aligned 
interest” category (25%, SD 22.5) and in “sender indifferent” (24.7%, SD 23.2), but 
comparatively high in “conflict” (60.8%, SD 21.5) (F(2,28)=34.97, p=.0001). Lying in the 
“conflict” category is significantly more frequent than in either “aligned interest” or “sender 
indifferent”, whereas we find no significant difference between the latter two categories. 
Furthermore, the possible gains for the sender if the receiver picks the state that is better for 
the sender, and the potential losses for the receiver if she picks the state that is worse for her, 
have a significant impact on the likelihood of sending the false message. Senders lie more 
often when the potential gains from lying are high (10€ or 5€; 55.8%, SD 19.2) than when 
they are low (1€ or 0€; 34.2%, SD 17.2; t(29)=6.1, p=.0001). Senders lie less often when the 
possible losses for the receiver are high (10€, 15€ or 20 €; 37.4%, SD 20.3) than when they 
are low (1€ or 5 €; 47.2%, SD 13.3; t(29)=-4.04, p=.0001). These results clearly indicate that 
monetary incentives affect the frequency of sending the false message. 
The relative frequency of sophisticated deception (as a fraction of the total number of 
cases in which the sender sent the objectively true message) depends on a game’s category in 
the same way the frequency of simple deception does. In the category “conflict”, we observe 
sophisticated deception in 59.3% (SD 31.5) of cases with true messages, whereas we observe 
it significantly less often in “sender indifferent” (40.9%, SD 28.6) and “aligned interest” 
(31.7%, SD 19.1; F(2,26)=14.98, p=.0001). This finding indicates sophisticated deception 
through telling the truth is most likely when the sender can profit most from it. Adding the 
cases of sophisticated deception to the cases of simple deception, the overall frequency of 
deception reaches 65.9% (SD 18.9) across all categories, whereas it is only 42.8% (SD 15.3) 
when taking into account only plain lies and ignoring deceptive behavior through truth telling. 
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Our assumption that truth telling may be less demanding than deceiving the interaction 
partner was confirmed for both sorts of lying: Telling a plain lie (M=2618 ms, SD=202) or 
engaging in sophisticated deception (M=2611 ms, SD=193) – while not significantly different 
from each other – takes significantly longer than telling the truth (M = 2453 ms, SD = 211) 
(F(2,30)=3.46, p=.044). This response pattern is crucially affected by the actual payoffs: A 3 
(category) x 3 (response (truth, SD, plain lies)) repeated measures ANOVA reveals a 
significant main effect of category (F(2,30)=6.44, p=.005), with “conflict” trials showing the 
longest RTs (M=2720 ms, SD=211) followed by “sender indifferent” trials (M=2565 ms, 
SD=203) and “aligned interest” trials (M=2397 ms, SD=200) (cp. Table 2). We take these 
results to support the notion that deceptive behavior, irrespective of how it is expressed, 
demands additional cognitive processes so as to suppress a pre-potent truthful answer. This is 
also supported by our post-session questionnaire data: senders report that it took them 
significantly longer to respond when stakes were high and that they had to deliberate harder 
when preparing to deceive the receiver.  
Additional results from the post-session questionnaire data reveal insights regarding 
strategy and heterogeneity. Concerning the former, 86.6% of the senders report having 
developed a strategy how to interact with the receiver and of those more than half (59.9%) 
report that their strategy depended on the difference in payoffs between sender and receiver as 
well as on the absolute amounts. The remaining senders indicate to have taken into account 
the frequency and succession of previous blue- and red-responses so as to determine how to 
respond. We take these findings to indicate that senders engaged, indeed, in our social 
interactive paradigm and cared about the actual payoffs. Concerning the issue of 
heterogeneity, the data display a heterogeneous sample. Being asked on how many of the 
trials they produced a deceptive response, senders on average say that they did so in 43.8% 
(SD=23) of the cases, the range being 5% to 90%. A closer look reveals that 36.6% of the 
senders have had a bad conscience when producing a deceptive response (with the feeling 
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even persisting for a couple of trials) and feel that they had lied in effect. These senders 
indicate to have lied in only a third of the trials (M=33.4%, SD=21.6). In contrast, the other 
senders (63.3%) report not having had a feeling of actually lying, and thus indicate having 
lied in approximately half of the trials (M=49.7%, SD=22.1, t(28)=-1.95, p=.06 (2-tailed)).   
 
Imaging Results 
Neural correlates of the intention to deceive in strategic interactions (simple and 
sophisticated deception > truth) 
To study the neural correlates of the intention to deceive, we contrast the hemodynamic 
activation of simple deception trials and sophisticated deception trials with truth trials and 
find activation within the right TPJ, superior temporal gyrus, precuneus extending into the 
retrosplenial cortex, cuneus bilaterally, and within the right superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 
(see Table 3 and Figure 2, upper panel). 
 
Neural correlates of lying in strategic interactions (simple deception > truth) 
To study the neural correlates of simple deception, i.e., sending a false message with the 
intention to deceive, we contrast the hemodynamic activation of simple deception trials with 
truth trials and find activation within the right TPJ, the dorsal ACC, the precuneus extending 
into the retrosplenial cortex, within the cuneus, the right anterior frontal gyrus, and a 
comparatively small activation focus within the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (amPFC) 
(see Table 4 and Figure 3, upper panel). 
 
Neural correlates of sophisticated deception (sophisticated deception > truth) 
To study the neural correlates of sophisticated deception specifically, we built a contrast of 
sophisticated deception trials and truth trials. We find activation within the right TPJ, the 
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precuneus, the left cuneus, the right anterior frontal gyrus (BA 10), and the superior temporal 
gyrus (see Table 5 and Figure 3, lower panel).  
 Importantly, this finding suggests sophisticated deception is not a variant of plainly 
telling the truth – in which case no activation differences in this contrast should have occurred 
– but a version of telling a lie, since a very similar activation pattern occurred as in the 
contrast “simple deception versus truth” (cp. upper panel in Figure 3).  
 
Neural correlates delineating the two forms of deception (sophisticated deception > simple 
deception)  
To test for the differences between the two forms of deception, we contrasted sophisticated 
deception trials with simple deception trials. We find activation bilaterally within the TPJ, the 
right middle temporal gyrus, the left superior temporal gyrus, the left frontal operculum, and 
within the mid-cingulate gyrus (see Table 6 and Figure 4, upper panel). 
 
Neural correlates of genuine truth trials 
Taking into account the sender’s true intention, we are able to extract genuine truth trials, i.e., 
trials where the sender sent the true message with the expectation that the receiver believes 
her (true) message. These trials are contrasted with both simple deception as well as 
sophisticated deception trials. We find activation within the habenular complex bilaterally, the 
right frontal operculum, the left pregenual ACC, and the right middle frontal gyrus (see Table 
7 and Figure 2, lower panel).  
 
Parametric analysis modeling the incentive to deceive for simple deception trials 
To test whether the activation that revealed for simple deception varies with the monetary 
incentive, we calculate a parametric analysis. Responses are modeled by a value that reflects 
the tension between the sender’s and the receiver’s payoffs. It is calculated as the product of 
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the differences of the sender’s and the receiver’s payoff for the pairs of states, i.e., (Sb-
Sr)*(Rr-Rb) (cp. MR Scanning Procedure). The posterior probability maps of this parametric 
analysis reveals the anterior median prefrontal cortex (amPFC), the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), and the anterior frontal gyrus (BA 10) to be more engaged the higher the 
conflict and thus the tension in payoffs between sender and receiver (see Table 8 and Figure 
4, lower panel).   
 
Discussion 
Many real life situations are characterized by informational asymmetries among interacting 
parties. Obviously, such situations may provide an incentive for either party to exploit the 
informational asymmetries to their own advantage. This may then imply the use of deception. 
In this fMRI study we analyze the neural foundations of deception in strategic interactions. 
Notably, in our paradigm, interaction partners were free whether or not to lie. Besides plain 
lying, we study a broader concept of deception by looking at what has been called 
sophisticated deception (Sutter, 2009). Here, telling the truth is counted as an act of deception 
when the sender expects the receiver not to follow the sender’s (true) message. Moreover, by 
taking into account the sender’s true intention, we can also determine the neural correlates of 
genuine truth trials. All in all, we take our results to show that brain activation patterns can 
reveal the sender’s true intention (to deceive), for instance when sending an objectively true 
message.  
 
Intention to deceive 
Particularly, our results reveal the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), the (pre)cuneus 
(CUN), retrosplenial cortex, and anterior frontal gyrus (aFG) to be specifically involved for 
the intention to deceive, irrespective of whether this is done by sending a false or a true 
message. The finding of activation within the rTPJ is in line with our hypothesis. Based on 
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previous findings and recent meta-analytic findings on deceptive behavior, we suggest this 
activation to reflect socio-cognitive processes during deception. Specifically, deceptive 
behavior crucially depends on the ability to anticipate the receiver’s mental state. The rTPJ, 
including posterior superior temporal and angular gyrus, have repeatedly been shown to be 
specifically involved when people have to integrate socially relevant information and to infer 
the mental states of others (Bahnemann et al., 2010; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Decety, & 
Grèzes, 2006; Decety, & Lamm, 2007; Saxe, 2006). Thus, the finding of rTPJ activation for 
deceptive behavior, realized either by telling a lie or telling the truth, is consistent with our 
hypothesis on the intentional aspects of deception in a social setting, in which the intentional 
states of others are integrated into one’s own reasoning (Grèze, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; 
Perner et al., 2006; Saxe, in press; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Walter et al., 2004). 
 Activation within the cuneus, precuneus and aFG were not expected specifically but 
cuneus activation may reflect increased requirements as to early visual processing (Vanni et 
al., 2001), e.g., when thoroughly inspecting the payoff matrix, that is then sent to several 
parietal areas (Fattori, Pitzalis, & Galletti, 2009); precuneus activation may reflect increased 
episodic memory retrieval processes (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006), for instance, retrieving past 
payoff matrices and one’s choices in the sender-receiver game, as well as automatic social 
monitoring processes when observing interacting people (Iacoboni et al., 2004; Leube et al., 
2012; Vrticka et al., 2013). And activation within the aFG may reflect the integration of the 
outcomes of two separate cognitive operations in the pursuit of a higher goal (Ramnani & 
Owen, 2004).  
 
Deception through telling the truth (sophisticated deception)  
Notably, finding this activation pattern both for simple as well as sophisticated deception 
trials, reveals that sophisticated deception, although superficially appearing as truth trials, 
cannot be considered a variant of plainly telling the truth – in which case no activation 
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differences between sophisticated deception and truth trials should have occurred. Rather, the 
intention to deceive seems to share a lot with deceptive behavior in terms of cognitive 
processes. Sophisticated deception, as defined in the context of our sender-receiver game, is a 
form of deception that crucially has to take into account the receiver’s reasoning. The sender 
has to form expectations about the receiver’s beliefs and has to adjust her own actions 
accordingly. Hence, rTPJ activation becomes characteristic for sophisticated deception. Based 
on this finding, we suggest that brain activation can reveal the sender’s veridical intention to 
deceive in the absence of overt lying. Accordingly, it seems warranted not to confine 
deception simply to telling a lie.  
 Interestingly, sophisticated deception seems also to stand out from simple deception. 
That is, trying to deceive the interaction partner by telling the truth requires greater processing 
demands than simply telling a lie. Particularly, given activation within the TPJ, lSTG, and 
MTG, we take this result to indicate greater demands when reading or inferring the partner’s 
thoughts and beliefs so as to correctly predict the receiver’s actions. That is, sophisticated 
deception differs from plainly telling a lie by heightened demands for ToM processes. Instead 
of construing additional activation (for instance within the frontal gyrus), our result may be 
understood as representing increasingly more complex processing of the social situation in 
strategic interaction (Bahnemann et al., 2010). 
 A further indication that simple and sophisticated deception are two different forms of 
deceptive behavior come from the parametric analysis. Only for simple deception trials part of 
the respective network was modulated by the distribution of monetary payoffs between sender 
and receiver. That is, activation within the dorsal ACC, amPFC, and aFG correlated positively 
the higher the conflict between sender’s and receiver’s payoffs. Activation within the dACC 
has consistently been related to conflict detection and monitoring processes (Carter & van 
Veen, 2007), although “conflict monitoring may be just one facet of the broader role of ACC 
in performance monitoring and the optimization of behavior” (Yeung, 2013, p.1, in press). 
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Carter and van Veen (2007) suggested the ACC’s specific role is “to detect conflict between 
simultaneous active, competing representations and to engage the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) to resolve such conflict” (p. 367). The greater involvement of this area for 
high conflict trials when sending false messages may indicate greater tension in situations 
where people resort to lying despite knowing of the normative appeal to tell the truth.  
 
Genuine truth trials 
By taking into account the sender’s veridical intention, we could determine the neural 
correlates of genuine truth trials in the present study. Hitherto, imaging studies on deceptive 
behavior did not report any significant activation for telling the truth, which could be due to 
truth trials being a heterogeneous category in those studies, potentially also including 
sophisticated deception trials. We found significant activation within the habenular complex 
bilaterally and the left frontal operculum and MTG. Based on animal research, the habenular 
complex has been suggested to be specifically involved in the control of the human reward 
system. For instance, the electrical stimulation of the habenular nuclei resulted in an 
inhibition of up to 90% of the dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area and substantia 
nigra in rats (Christoph, Leonzio, & Wilcox, 1986). In contrast, lesions to the habenular 
complex resulted in an “increased dopamine turnover in the nucleus accumbens, striatum, and 
prefrontal cortex, reflecting an activation of the dopaminergic system (Lisoprawski et al., 
1980; Nishikawa, Fage, & Scatton, 1986)” (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2003, p. 4308). Based 
on these as well as anatomical data, it has been suggested that the habenular complex serves 
as a “critical modulatory relay between the limbic forebrain structures and the midbrain” 
(Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2003, p. 4309). Accordingly, habenular activation for telling the 
truth in strategic interactions in the present study may reduce the probability of phasic 
dopamine release in the reward system, and thus may reinforce truth telling through 
weakening the incentive of the monetary profits.   
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In sum, our study provides a new paradigm for studying the neural basis of deception in 
human interaction. Contrary to previous studies with instructed deception in non-interactive 
contexts, we have created a social interactive context based on game-theoretic modeling. 
Importantly, we are the first to investigate the neural foundations of an intention to deceive in 
the absence of overt lying. Such sophisticated deception through telling the truth is an 
intriguing alternative to telling a plain lie, and it can be strategically used, as in the Austrian 
writer Franz Grillparzer’s comedy “Woe to him who is lying” in which the young kitchen boy 
Leon frees his bishop’s captured nephew by telling the guards he is going to free their 
hostage, and they let him proceed because they don’t believe him. 
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Figures and Figure Captions 
Figure 1 
Figure caption 
This is how we presented the payoffs in the two states of the world to the sender. Tables 1-3 
in the Appendix list all 90 games. Example matrices of the sender-receiver paradigm are 
given for the three conditions “conflict” (panel A), “sender indifferent” (panel B), and 
“aligned interest” (panel C). The sender is shown a specific payoff matrix and can send either 
of two messages: “Red is more profitable for you.” Or “Blue is more profitable for you.” 
After response selection and on the next screen, the participant has to answer the following 
question: “Which state do you expect the receiver to choose? The red column or the blue 
column?” Importantly, the sender’s message does not have a direct impact on the payoffs for 
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Figure 2 
Figure Caption 
Upper Panel: Intention to deceive in strategic interactions: Results are shown for the 
contrast simple deception and sophisticated deception trials versus truth trials.  
Lower Panel: Telling the truth: Results are shown for the contrast truth trials versus simple 
deception and sophisticated deception trials.  
Abbreviations: aFG: anterior frontal gyrus; MFG: middle frontal gyrus; rTPJ: right temporo-
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Figure 3  
Figure Caption 
Upper Panel: Simple Deception: Results are shown for the contrast simple deception trials 
versus truth trials.  
Lower Panel: Sophisticated Deception: Results are shown for the contrast sophisticated 
deception trials versus truth trials.  
Abbreviations: aFG: anterior frontal gyrus; dACC: dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; rTPJ: 






  33 
Figure 4 
Figure Caption 
Upper Panel: Delineating the two forms of deception: Results are shown for the contrast 
sophisticated deception trials versus simple deception trials.  
Lower Panel: Parametric analysis modeling the incentive to deceive for simple deception 
trials: Results are shown for the positive correlational analysis, i.e., the activation is stronger 
the higher the conflict and thus the tension in payoffs between sender and receiver.  
Abbreviations: aFG: anterior frontal gyrus; amPFC: anterior median prefrontal cortex; dACC: 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; lSTG: left superior temporal gyrus; lTPJ: left temporo-
parietal junction; MTG: middle temporal gyrus. For visualization, a threshold of 99.4% was 
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Tables 
Table 1: Performance refers to the answer to the first question: “Which option (blue or red) is 
more profitable for Player 2?”; intention to deceive refers to the answer to the second 










No Plain truth 
Yes Sophisticated Deception 
No 
Yes Simple Deception 
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Table 2: Reaction times (in ms) split by category (“aligned interest”, “sender indifferent”, 
and “conflict”, please cp. section on stimuli and experimental paradigm for more details) and 
deceptive behavior (truth, sophisticated deception (SD), and plain lies).  
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Table 3: Intention to deceive in strategic interactions: Laterality, anatomical specification, 
Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations 
according to Bayesian analysis are shown for the contrast simple deception and sophisticated 
deception trials versus truth trials. 
 
Brain region X Y Z Max mm3 
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 55 -42 17 99.92 108 
R. Superior temporal gyrus 43 -27 6 99.99 270 
R. Precuneus 


























R. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 35 57 -2 99.99 216 
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Table 4: Simple deception versus truth: Laterality, anatomical specification, Talairach 
coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations according to 
Bayesian analysis are shown for the contrast simple deception trials versus truth trials. 
 
Brain region X Y Z Max mm3 
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 58 -42 17 99.98 648 
R. Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 3 36 23 99.87 162 
R. Precuneus 










R. Cuneus 6 -90 15 99.99 6021 










R. anterior median prefrontal cortex 
(amPFC) 
6 54 4 99.87 108 
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Table 5: Sophisticated deception versus truth: Laterality, anatomical specification, 
Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations 
according to Bayesian analysis are shown for the contrast sophisticated deception trials versus 
truth trials. 
 
Brain region X Y Z Max mm3 
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 55 -51 23 99.86 162 
R. Precuneus 6 -54 50 99.99 1188 
L. Cuneus -6 -81 15 99.99 1107 
R. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 32 57 1 99.91 216 
R. Superior temporal gyrus  43 -27 6 99.86 162 
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Table 6: Sophisticated deception versus simple deception: Laterality, anatomical 
specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities, and size (mm3) for 
activations according to Bayesian analysis are shown for the contrast sophisticated deception 
trials versus simple deception trials. 
  
Brain region X Y Z Max mm3 












R. Middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 49 -27 -7 99.97 432 
L. Superior temporal gyrus (STG) -55 0 -2 99.90 243 
L. Insula -40 10 6 99.92 432 
R. Mid-cingulate gyrus 6 0 42 99.98 432 
 
  
  40 
Table 7: Truth versus simple and sophisticated deception: Laterality, anatomical 
specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities, and size (mm3) for 
activations according to Bayesian analysis are shown for the contrast truth trials versus simple 
deception and sophisticated deception trials. 
 
Brain region X Y Z Max mm3 












R. Operculum 49 15 4 99.98 351 
L. Pregenual anterior cingulate cortex -3 33 4 99.96 135 
R. Middle frontal gyrus 41 36 20 99.92 108 
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Table 8: Parametric analysis modeling the incentive to deceive for simple deception 
trials: Laterality, anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior 
probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations according to Bayesian analysis are shown for the 
parametric contrast modeling the tension between the sender’s and receiver’s payoff in simple 
deception trials. 
 
Brain region X Y Z Max mm3 
R. anterior median prefrontal cortex 
(amPFC) 
3 54 -5 99.96 297 
R. Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 6 15 37 99.96 459 
R. Middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) 35 42 12 99.97 378 
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Appendix  
A.1 Instructions for the sender (being scanned) 
Dear Participant!  
 
Today, you are going to participate in the following experiment:  
On the screen you will be presented with a table that might look like this one: 






Player-2 cannot see the numbers in this table, which correspond to Euros. Player-2 will have 
to choose either the red or blue column for implementation.  
Before Player-2 does so, you can send a message to Player-2 that states which of the columns 
(blue or red) is more profitable for Player-2. Note that Player-2 does not get any other 
information except your message.  
 
If Player-2 decides to choose the blue column, you will receive the amount of Euros that are 
indicated in the upper blue box (i.e., 1 Euro in this example) and Player-2 will get the amount 
of Euros that are indicated in the lower blue box (i.e., 5 Euros in this example).  
 
If Player-2 decides to choose the red column, you will receive the amount of Euros that are 
indicated in the upper red box (i.e., 5 Euros in this example) and Player-2 will get the amount 
of Euros that are indicated in the lower red box (i.e., 1 Euro in this example).   
Player-2 
Myself  
5            1 
1            5 
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Thus, you will always get one of the amounts that are displayed in the upper half of the table 
and Player-2 will always get one of the amounts displayed in the lower half of the table. The 
choice of Player-2 will determine whether the red or the blue column is relevant for payment. 
 
An Example: You are sending a message to Player-2 that the blue column is more profitable 
for Player-2. Consider Player-2 indeed picks the blue column. As a result, you would receive 
1 Euro and Player-2 would receive 5 Euros.    
 
Procedure 




If you would like to send the message “The blue column is more profitable for you”, then 
press the blue button.  
If you would like to send the message “The red column is more profitable for you”, then press 
the red button.  
 
Please note again, Player-2 does not learn about the specific amounts, but can only choose 
between the blue and the red column.  
After each decision, Player-2 gets the information how many Euros he or she has received in 
the specific trial. Yet, Player-2 does not learn how much she would have received had she 
opted for the other column. Neither does she learn about how many Euros you actually had 
received or how many points you would have received in the other column. Therefore, Player-
2 will never be able to judge whether you sent a correct or an incorrect message.  
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Please note: it is important that you do not ponder for too long for each decisions, but decide 
within eight seconds, since the response buttons become inactive after eight seconds and the 
game automatically proceeds. If you accidentally miss one trial, this is not dramatic, but you 
should try to respond within the eight seconds.  
 
After your choice for sending one of the two messages (and after eight seconds), you will be 
asked “What do you think which column (blue or red) is Player-2 going to choose?” You can 
indicate your response again by pressing the left (blue) or right (red) response button. You 
have four seconds for this response before the experiment automatically proceeds.   
 
All your responses are recorded and after you finished the experiment they will be presented 
to Player-2 outside the scanner. Being informed about your message for each trial, Player-2 
will have to decide on each trial whether to go for blue or red. Player-2 therefore never learns 
about the allocation of Euros in a particular trial; she only received your message. Thus, 
Player-2 cannot judge whether your message is correct or incorrect.  
 
By the time when Player-2 finished the experiment, one trial will randomly be selected and 
paid to both of you accordingly. So, you could get as much as 30 Euros maximum! 
 
If you have questions, please do not hesitate to ask them now, otherwise we start with the 
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A.2 Instructions for the receiver (recipient of the sender’s messages) 
Dear Participant!  
 
Another player (Player-1) has just finished part 1 of our experiment. In this part, Player-1 was 
presented with various tables, which differed in the amount of Euros (indicated as numbers in 








The upper half of the table corresponds to the profits Player-1 could get and the lower half to 
the profits you could get. Hence, you are in the role of Player-2 in this experiment. The profits 
of both players are linked such that always only ONE column (blue OR red) can be valid 
while the other becomes obsolete. Which of the two columns is valid entirely depends on 
YOUR choice, albeit you will never be presented with the specific tables and their associated 
potential profits.  
In contrast, Player-1 is presented with the specific tables and the associated potential profits; 
yet, Player-1 is not authorized to decide which of the columns will become valid and hence 
which profits the two of you may receive. However, Player-1 can send you a message 
whether the blue or the red column is more profitable for you. The messages by Player-1 in 
each single trial were recorded and stored and will now be loaded accordingly for your 





5            1 
1            5 
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Here is an example screen: 










If you press the blue button, the choice for the blue column is logged in and vice versa for the 
red button. Once you pressed a button, the next round starts, in which you are asked to make a 
new decision on which column to choose. Overall, there are 90 trials.   
Once more, over the course of the experiment, you will neither learn about the various profits 
associated with the 90 tables nor about the specific distribution of the profits for you (Player-
2) and Player-1 (e.g., identical or opposed profits). Just note, that the maximum profits for 
you or Player-1 are 30 Euros.  
If you decide upon the blue (red) column, the profits in the blue (red) column are paid out to 
you and Player-1. But note that not all trials are paid out! Once you finished the 90 decisions, 
only ONE trial is randomly selected and paid to both of you accordingly.  
 
Thank you very much for your attention and enjoy!  
  
Round: 1 
   
Player-1 sent the following message: 
 
 





Which column do you choose? 
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A.3 Overview of the full set of games  
Listed are all matrices that were employed in the sender-receiver paradigm classified by 
category. Sender Red: payoff for the sender when state Red is chosen, sender Blue: payoff for 
the sender when state Blue is chosen, receiver Red: payoff for the receiver when choosing 
state Red, receiver Blue: payoff for the receiver when choosing state Blue (see also Figure 1 
in the manuscript).  
Table A1 
Listed are all matrices in category “conflict” (n=45).  
Sender Red  Receiver Red  Sender Blue Receiver Blue 
1 0 0 1 
5 6 6 5 
11 10 10 11 
16 15 15 16 
20 21 21 20 
5 0 0 5 
5 10 10 5 
15 10 10 15 
20 15 15 20 
20 25 25 20 
0 10 10 0 
15 5 5 15 
10 20 20 10 
25 15 15 25 
20 30 30 20 
0 5 1 0 
5 10 6 5 
10 15 11 10 
16 15 15 20 
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20 25 21 20 
1 0 0 10 
5 15 6 5 
10 20 11 10 
15 25 16 15 
21 20 20 30 
5 0 0 10 
10 5 5 15 
15 10 10 20 
20 15 15 25 
20 30 25 20 
0 1 5 0 
5 6 10 5 
15 10 10 11 
20 15 15 16 
20 21 25 20 
0 1 10 0 
15 5 5 6 
10 11 20 10 
15 16 25 15 
30 20 20 21 
10 0 0 5 
15 5 5 10 
10 15 20 10 
15 20 25 15 
30 20 20 25 
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Table A2 
Listed are all matrices in category “sender indifferent” (n=27). 
Sender Red  Receiver Red  Sender Blue Receiver Blue 
1 0 1 1 
6 5 6 6 
11 10 11 11 
1 5 1 0 
6 10 6 5 
11 15 11 10 
1 0 1 10 
6 15 6 5 
11 20 11 10 
5 0 5 5 
10 5 10 10 
15 10 15 15 
5 10 5 0 
10 15 10 5 
15 20 15 10 
5 0 5 15 
10 5 10 20 
15 10 15 25 
10 10 10 0 
15 15 15 5 
20 20 20 10 
10 0 10 15 
15 5 15 20 
20 25 20 10 
10 0 10 20 
15 5 15 25 
20 30 20 10 
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Table A3 
Listed are all matrices in category “aligned interest” (n=18). 
Sender Red  Receiver Red  Sender Blue Receiver Blue 
1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 5 
1 10 0 0 
5 5 6 6 
6 10 5 5 
5 5 6 15 
10 10 11 11 
11 15 10 10 
10 10 11 20 
5 1 0 0 
0 0 5 5 
5 10 0 0 
5 5 10 6 
10 10 5 5 
5 5 10 15 
10 10 15 11 
15 15 10 10 
15 20 10 10 
 
 
 
